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In software platform ecosystems, the technological and
structural peculiarities vest the platform owner with an
extremely powerful position that puts any complementor at
the mercy of the platform owner's actions. Paradoxically, it
is the self-determination and proactivity of the com-
plementors that determine the ecosystem's success through
their surprising outside innovations. This study addresses
this power paradox by unpacking the power dynamics
between platform owners and complementors. Based on an
exploratory multiple-case study of six platform partnerships,
we find that power in platform ecosystems unfolds as a
reciprocal process of three interlocking cycles, in which both
the platform owner and the complementors take an active
role. The modus operandi of power in platform ecosystems
is a “central power cycle” in which the complementors
repeatedly evaluate whether to accept or reject the plat-
form owner's domination power. Thriving partnerships sus-
tain this central power cycle over time, which requires that
the platform owner and the complementors dynamically
adapt their wielding of power to the changing needs of the
partnership (partnership adaptation cycle) or the ecosystem
(ecosystem redefinition cycle). For the platform owner, this
entails the occasional use of manipulation to favour a partic-
ular partnership or redefining the ecosystem's framework
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and sporadically wielding coercion in favour of the broader
ecosystem. For the complementor, this entails over-
subjectification to entice the platform owner to wield its
power in favour of their partnership. Our findings have
important implications for platform ecosystem and power
theory, as well as managerial practice.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Partnerships between platform owners and complementors harbour a power paradox: The technological and struc-
tural characteristics of platform ecosystems constitute an extremely powerful position of the platform owner, such
that each complementor is at the mercy of the actions taken by the platform owner (Huang, Ceccagnoli, Forman, &
Wu, 2013; Kude, Dibbern, & Heinzl, 2012). However, despite this powerful position of the platform owner, com-
plementors are not powerless, as the success of the ecosystem depends on their self-determination and proactivity
as drivers of often unforeseen and surprising outside innovation (Foerderer, Kude, Mithas, & Heinzl, 2018;
Ghazawneh & Henfridsson, 2013; Tiwana, Konsynski, & Bush, 2010). Specifically, complementors make a wide
variety of autonomous decisions that directly and significantly affect the value co-created in platform partnerships.
These include decisions about the type of software and specific features to offer (Sarker, Sarker, Sahaym, &
Bjørn-Andersen, 2012; Wareham, Fox, & Giner, 2014), as well as what innovative solutions to develop (Ceccagnoli,
Forman, Huang, & Wu, 2012; Grover & Kohli, 2012) and how to market and sell them (Huber, Kude, &
Dibbern, 2017; Kude et al., 2012). While the literature on platform ecosystems has acknowledged the importance of
power in general (Cusumano, Gawer, & Yoffie, 2019; Hinings, Gegenhuber, & Greenwood, 2018) and advocated for
careful consideration of paradoxical tensions (Huber et al., 2017; Hurni, Huber, Dibbern, & Krancher, 2020; Sarker
et al., 2012; Wareham et al., 2014), we lack a systematic understanding of how this power paradox is addressed.
Prior IS research has predominantly investigated the power issues that occur in organisations with hierarchical
command-and-control structures (eg, Azad & Faraj, 2011; Dhillon, Caldeira, & Wenger, 2011; Doolin, 2004;
Markus, 1983) during the implementation and use of information systems (see Jasperson et al., 2002 for an over-
view). In such contexts, power processes are typically unidirectional, that is, the actor higher up in the hierarchy
imposes its will upon the actor lower down. In contrast, complementors in platform partnerships assume a far more
self-determined and proactive role. Consequently, power in platform ecosystems is likely to be a reciprocal process
shaped by both the powerful platform owner and the seemingly powerless complementors. However, how exactly
the platform owner may wield and adapt its power in a way that is acceptable to the complementors, and how these
complementors may accept or reject and actively shape it, remains unclear. Moreover, these reciprocal power
dynamics are likely to be multi-level, as effective management of platform partnerships requires platform owners to
respond to the (changing) needs of the ecosystem and individual partnerships (Sarker et al., 2012). For example, by
setting a standard, the platform owner can wield power at the ecosystem level (Boudreau & Hagiu, 2009; Wareham
et al., 2014), while its discretion in enforcing such standards allows for flexibility in tailoring its exercise of power to
individual platform partnerships (Huber et al., 2017; Hurni et al., 2020). Therefore, studying power in platform eco-
systems promises unique empirical and theoretical insights into how power is wielded in modern contexts of innova-
tion co-creation and how the power moves of platform owners and complementors interact over time and across
levels. Accordingly, our goal is to answer the following research question divided into three parts: How does power
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manifest itself in platform partnerships, how do the power moves of platform owners and complementors interact, and
how do the resulting power dynamics relate to the value co-created in platform partnerships?
We conducted an in-depth, retrospective multiple-case study of six platform owner–complementor partnerships
to address this research question (Klein & Myers, 1999; Walsham, 1995). Drawing on the comprehensive, multi-level
power conceptualization of Fleming and Spicer (2014), our analysis shows how and why power dynamics in platform
ecosystems unfold as three interlocking cycles, in which both the platform owner and the complementor take an
active role. Furthermore, our analysis shows how alternative power dynamics lead to platform partnerships that (con-
tinue to) thrive or (begin to) wither. Our findings contribute novel insights into the nature of power processes in plat-
form partnerships, the active role that seemingly powerless complementors take in this process, and the importance
of these power dynamics for co-creation processes and outcomes. These findings have significant implications for
platform ecosystem and power theory, as well as managerial practice.
Next, we elaborate on the power paradox in platform ecosystems. Then, we outline the theoretical evolu-
tion of power research, which we use as a basis to develop the conceptual foundations of this study. Following
this, we present our method and our findings and discuss the contributions, implications and limitations of our
research.
2 | THE POWER PARADOX IN SOFTWARE PLATFORM ECOSYSTEMS
Software platform ecosystems are complex inter-organisational settings for relationships between an independent
platform owner that provides and controls a platform with core functionality and the many independent com-
plementors that use standardised interfaces to develop innovative complements and extend this platform (Tiwana
et al., 2010). This setting harbours a power paradox, which we will discuss below.
2.1 | Co-creation through self-determined and proactive complementors
The co-creation logic that underlies platform ecosystems requires complementors to assume a far more self-
determined and proactive role than in traditional technology-creation contexts. Such traditional contexts build on
hierarchical command-and-control structures through which power is wielded (Marabelli & Galliers, 2017;
Reed, 2012). However, in platform ecosystems, the platform owner needs to coax rather than coerce (Parker & van
Alstyne, 2017), since the complementors are legally independent companies and thus not part of a traditional
command-and-control structure (Huber et al., 2017; Wareham et al., 2014). This lack of a command-and-control
structure is not a mere anomaly, but one of the defining characteristics of platform-based co-creation (Ceccagnoli
et al., 2012; Sarker et al., 2012). It rests on the premise of surprising outside innovation that emerges—not because
the platform owner hired someone to create it, but through the actions of self-determined and proactive com-
plementors (Foerderer et al., 2018; Ghazawneh & Henfridsson, 2013; Tiwana et al., 2010). This characteristic distin-
guishes co-creation in platform ecosystems from asymmetric buyer–supplier relationships, such as those found in
the retail or automotive sectors. In asymmetric buyer–supplier relationships, dominant actors (such as Walmart or
Volkswagen) contract suppliers to deliver finished (pre-)products according to predefined specifications, to sell these
products in their stores directly or indirectly as components of their final products (eg, a car) (Dyer, Singh, &
Hesterly, 2018). In contrast, in platform-based co-creation, the complementors take a much more self-determined
and proactive role: the complementors decide what types of software and specific feature sets to offer (Sarker
et al., 2012; Wareham et al., 2014), what innovative solutions to develop (Ceccagnoli et al., 2012; Grover &
Kohli, 2012), and how to market and sell these solutions (Huber et al., 2017; Kude et al., 2012). Such autonomous
complementor decisions are a vital driver of different co-creation outcomes in platform partnerships because they
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directly translate into discernible instances of co-created value, such as additional joint revenues, customers, or mar-
kets (Schreieck, Wiesche, & Krcmar, 2017).
2.2 | Technological and structural conditions lend power to the platform owner
In platform ecosystems, complementors are, to a certain extent, at the platform owner's mercy, as their products and
services are inextricably linked to the software platform developed and controlled by the platform owner. Specifi-
cally, the platform serves as the technological base for complementary products and services offered by the com-
plementors (Tiwana et al., 2010). The complementors access the platform via application programming interfaces
(APIs) and extend it using software development kits (SDKs) and native code for satisfying user needs beyond the
platform's core functionality (Ceccagnoli et al., 2012; Ghazawneh & Henfridsson, 2013; Sarker et al., 2012). Further-
more, the platform owner unilaterally determines how fast and in which direction the platform will evolve
(Boudreau, 2010, 2012), thereby shaping the direction that complementors take for their product and service offer-
ings. For example, the nature of novel features that complementors can offer and the markets they can penetrate or
must abandon depend on changes in the underlying platform (Foerderer et al., 2018).
Apart from these technological conditions, the unique one-to-many structure of platform ecosystems harbours
asymmetric resource dependencies that lend the platform owner power over both the ecosystem as a whole and
each complementor (Kude et al., 2012). In particular, the platform owner makes ecosystem-specific investments to
create and maintain valuable resources for many, if not all, of its complementors (Boudreau & Hagiu, 2009). Such
resources include the software platform, standardised APIs, SDKs and code repositories (Ghazawneh &
Henfridsson, 2013; Kude et al., 2012). In contrast, complementors make platform-specific investments by creating
and maintaining resources that are significantly more valuable within their partnership with the platform owner than
outside of it (Dyer et al., 2018). For example, the complementors acquire platform-specific technological knowledge
and certifications (Kude et al., 2012; Wareham et al., 2014). Because of these asymmetric resource investments, the
platform owner hardly depends on individual complementors, but rather the entire ecosystem, whereas the com-
plementors heavily depend on the platform owner.
2.3 | The power paradox and prior IS research
Prior IS research has provided little insight into how to address the unique power paradox in platform ecosystems.
Instead, it has focused primarily on power processes in contexts where the main goal is not the co-creation of value
and power asymmetries are not an issue. This includes research on power processes during the implementation and
use of IS in traditional intra-organisational contexts (Jasperson et al., 2002), such as firms (Dhillon et al., 2011;
Howcroft & Light, 2006; Markus, 1983) or healthcare facilities (Cendon & Jarvenpaa, 2001; Doolin, 2004) and
research on power in more transactional client-vendor relationships (eg, Heiskanen, Newman, & Eklin, 2008; Levina &
Orlikowski, 2009; Pozzebon & Pinsonneault, 2012).
The few studies that have investigated power in co-creation contexts focused on partnerships between equals,
which are not characterised by the uniquely asymmetric resource dependencies that plague platform ecosystems
(eg, Hart & Saunders, 1997; Valença & Alves, 2017; Valença, Alves, & Jansen, 2018). Moreover, prior IS research on
platform ecosystems, while acknowledging the importance of both power (Cusumano et al., 2019; Hinings
et al., 2018) and the balancing of paradoxical tensions (Huber et al., 2017; Hurni et al., 2020; Sarker et al., 2012;
Wareham et al., 2014), has merely considered power and paradoxes in isolation, with little or no cross-pollination.
Given this void about the role of power in the co-creation of digital innovation, in general, and specifically about
how to address the unique power paradox in platform ecosystems, this study aims to provide vital theoretical and
empirical insights into the critical, yet somewhat marginalised (Marabelli & Galliers, 2017; Silva, 2007; Simeonova,
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Gaillers, & Karanasios, 2020), issue of power dynamics in IS (Hurni & Huber, 2014; Valença et al., 2018; Valença &
Alves, 2017). To sensitise the reader to these insights and create a solid foundation for our power conceptualization,
the following outlines the theoretical evolution of power research.
3 | THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF POWER
In the past, multiple views have emerged on what constitutes power and which overt and covert characteristics it
possesses (Jasperson et al., 2002). In other words, power is “not [one] Thing at all but many Things” (Dahl, 1957,
p. 201). This section outlines the historical development of the power concept across different stages.
Early work considers power to be a powerful actor's capacity to press other actors to do something against their
will (Polsby, 1963; Weber, 1947). The most influential advocate of this view is Dahl (1957, pp. 202–203), who
defined power as something actor A has over actor B “to the extent that he [or she] can get B to do something that
B would not otherwise do”. Underlying this view is the idea of an overt conflict of interest between A and B that is
“resolved” through enforcing A's interest by mobilising A's power (Hardy & Leiba-O'Sullivan, 1998). According to this
view, the power of A over B builds on a particular basis (French Jr & Raven, 1959; Mechanic, 1962), such as a formal
position (Hickson, Hinings, Lee, Schneck, & Pennings, 1971), command structure (Thompson, 1956), or the control
over valuable resources (Pettigrew, 1973; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1974).
This coercive view of power was soon seen as too narrow, which is why researchers who advocated for opening
the concept of power became increasingly vocal (Gouldner, 1970). The most prominent advocates were Bachrach
and Baratz (1962), who argued that power is about coercing B to do something he or she would not otherwise do
and preventing B from doing something he or she would like to do. The underlying conflict of interest thus remains
covert. Therefore, research began to recognise more subtle behaviours as expressions of power, such as excluding B
from decision-making processes and the repurposing, inventive use, and even misuse of existing rules (Bachrach &
Baratz, 1970; Ranson, Hinings, & Greenwood, 1980).
As broader social sciences refocused their interests on how institutional forces channel social behaviour
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977), power research moved on from purely action-oriented views to
systemic views (Digeser, 1992). For example, Luke's (1974) radical view understands power as inscribed and embed-
ded in the existing, unquestioned order of things that continually shape behaviours and appear natural and
unchangeable. Accordingly, power is located in organisational and societal institutions (Hardy & Leiba-
O'Sullivan, 1998), including ideologies (Alvesson, 1984), (organisational) cultures, and “deep structures” (Ranson
et al., 1980; Willmott, 1993). The underlying idea is that institutions are not power-neutral. Instead, institutions
embody the power imbalances between different actors that can make B act against his or her own interest and
instead favour A's interest—even if A does not show any direct behavioural expressions of power (Clegg, 1989).
Later work on systemic and institution-based power emphasised the active role of seemingly powerless actors
vis-à-vis impersonal institutions (Hardy, 1994; Hayward, 1998). Much of this work was inspired by Foucault (1977,
1982), who stressed that the subjects, that is, A and B, should be understood as socially constructed entities, whose
sense of self is shaped by broader societal role expectations (Knights & Willmott, 1989; Townley, 1993). The under-
lying notion of subjectification views even less powerful actors as active subjects of power (Hayward, 1998)—actors
that construct their own identities and realities (du Gay, 1996) and make their own decisions about their behaviour
(Grant, Hardy, Oswick, & Putnam, 2004). In this sense, neither A nor B holds power; instead, power resides in the
social construction processes between them (Hardy & Leiba-O'Sullivan, 1998).
This historical outline reveals two key developments: first, action-oriented power views became increas-
ingly integrative, incorporating behaviours beyond coercion. Second, power views developed from a purely
action-oriented to an institution-based understanding, mirrored by the widely established distinction between
episodic (or direct) and systemic (or indirect) forms of power (Clegg, 1989; Lawrence, Malhotra, &
Morris, 2012). This distinction is also at the heart of Fleming and Spicer's (2014) recent integrative power
HURNI ET AL. 5
conceptualization. Next, we outline this conceptualization and utilise it as a basis for understanding power in
platform ecosystems.
4 | TOWARD A CONTEXTUALISED POWER CONCEPT FOR PLATFORM
ECOSYSTEMS
This section first highlights the merits of Fleming and Spicer's (2014) power conceptualization in terms of under-
standing the power paradox in platform ecosystems. It then develops a contextualised understanding of its key
concepts.
4.1 | The unique strengths of Fleming and Spicer's power conceptualization
Three key features make Fleming and Spicer's (2014) power conceptualization particularly useful for advancing our
understanding of the power paradox in platform ecosystems. First, Fleming and Spicer (2014) converge with prior
power conceptualizations by distinguishing between episodic power (ie, the direct exercise of power) and systemic
power (ie, the more indirect institutional power structures). This distinction frames power as a multi-dimensional
phenomenon with different forms situated at different levels. This feature is particularly relevant in the context of
platform ecosystems, where platform owners are powerful at both the ecosystem and partnership (ie, dyadic) levels
(Wareham et al., 2014).
Second, by decomposing episodic and systemic power into four different “faces”, Fleming and Spicer (2014)
establish a finer-grained distinction that enables more granular insights into dynamic power processes. Beyond that,
they also provide a conceptual tool to advance the tradition of studying power as an emergent and reciprocal pro-
cess that unfolds as interactions between different power types. This finer-grained distinction broadly reflects the
evolutionary stages outlined above (Fleming & Spicer, 2014, pp. 240–245), with coercion and manipulation as epi-
sodic and domination and subjectification as systemic faces of power (Fleming & Spicer, 2014).
Third, by incorporating subjectification into their conceptualization, Fleming and Spicer (2014) acknowledge the
critical roles of both the (in-principle) powerful and the (seemingly) powerless actor. Thus, different from prior con-
ceptualizations, power is not seen as primarily negative and imposed upon the powerless (Fleming & Spicer, 2014;
Simeonova et al., 2020). This feature allows us to emphasise how both the platform owner and the complementors
shape power processes.
4.2 | The four faces of power in the context of platform ecosystems
Domination refers to the power rooted in hegemonic institutions that appear inevitable and natural (Fleming &
Spicer, 2014). In platform ecosystems, the platform owner's domination power rests on its capacity to act as the reg-
ulator or social planner of its ecosystem (Boudreau & Hagiu, 2009; Parker & van Alstyne, 2017, p. 3015). Although
platform ecosystem research has not yet explicitly investigated power issues, it suggests that the platform owner's
domination power finds its expression in a hegemonic ecosystem framework that applies to all complementors. Such
a hegemonic ecosystem framework entails ecosystem-wide strategies (Anderson Jr., Parker, & Tan, 2014; Cennamo &
Santalo, 2013), technologies (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017; Song, Xue, Rai, & Zhang, 2017), standards, rules, and regula-
tions (Huber et al., 2017; Scholten & Scholten, 2012; Wareham et al., 2014). The fact that the hegemonic framework
applies to the entire ecosystem and must be accepted by the complementors as given and unchanging reflects the
systemic nature of the platform owner's domination power.
6 HURNI ET AL.
Coercion refers to the direct mobilisation of power by a powerful actor to persuade or even press another actor
to do something “or else” (Fleming & Spicer, 2007, p. 14). In platform ecosystems, coercion describes the platform
owner's capacity to press or push particular complementors to do something they would not have otherwise done.
Coercion thus operates at the partnership level. Although prior research argued that the platform owner “can coax,
but it cannot coerce” (Parker & van Alstyne, 2017, p. 3015), it maintains some coercive power. Specifically, some
resources it controls are central to the complementors' products, services and strategy (see above). For example,
platform owners have been shown to use the threat of withdrawing access to valuable resources to press particular
complementors to integrate their product more closely with the platform (Ozalp, Cennamo, & Gawer, 2018). Like-
wise, platform owners may offer incentives to push particular complementors to act in their platform's interest
(Rietveld, Schilling, & Bellavitis, 2019).
Manipulation refers to the active wielding of existing institutional rules to ensure that actions occur within
desired boundaries (Fleming & Spicer, 2014). In platform ecosystems, manipulation entails the repurposing and even
misuse of the hegemonic ecosystem framework so that the actions of particular complementors remain within
desired boundaries. Manipulation thus operates at the partnership level. In support of this idea, prior research has
shown that platform owners can bend ecosystem rules and standards to achieve desirable partnership-level results
(Lueker, Foerderer, & Heinzl, 2018). For example, a platform owner can repurpose its partner program to grant spe-
cific complementors preferential access to resources (Huber et al., 2017).
Subjectification refers to the self-subjugation toward predefined roles or identities. In platform ecosystems,
subjectification describes the subjugation to different identity templates and role expectations. For the com-
plementors, such identity templates and role expectations typically build on the hegemonic ecosystem framework
(see above), which stipulates stratified partner programs with rights, duties, and responsibilities at different partner
levels (Wareham et al., 2014). The notion of subjectification also foregrounds the possibility of power processes
requiring active conformance acts with predefined identity templates on the part of only seemingly powerless actors
(Lindgren, Eriksson, & Lyytinen, 2015). The platform owner can also choose to subjectify itself to different roles asso-
ciated with competing role expectations (Sarker et al., 2012; Wareham et al., 2014). On one hand, platform owners
may face the expectation to act in the best interest of the ecosystem as a whole (Kude et al., 2012; Wareham
et al., 2014), that is, to take on an ecosystem mindset. To conform with this expectation, the platform owner may
redefine the hegemonic ecosystem framework (and thus the basis of its domination power). On the other hand, plat-
form owners may have to respond flexibly to specific needs of particular complementors (Huber et al., 2017; Hurni
et al., 2020), that is, take on a partnership mindset. Such flexible responses may result in power being wielded at the
partnership level rather than the ecosystem level.
According to Fleming and Spicer (2014), actors may wield the four power faces depending on the situation and
moment. They also point out that the power faces are not independent, acknowledging that their interdependencies' exact
nature is unexplored. Our study attempts to get to the bottom of these particular interdependencies by examining the
power dynamics in platform partnerships. In particular, we aim to gain a more detailed understanding of the potentially
reciprocal andmulti-level nature of power in the platform ecosystem, given the unique power paradox. From this, we expect
to understand better how power dynamics in platform ecosystems are associated with different co-creation outcomes, as
well as how platformowners and complementors can effectively respond to the power paradox.
5 | METHOD
We conducted an in-depth, retrospective multiple-case study of six purposefully sampled platform owner–
complementor partnerships from three different platform ecosystems (Klein & Myers, 1999; Walsham, 1995). Ini-
tially, we approached four major platform owners, all of which offer various enterprise software platforms, ranging
from business applications to middleware and databases. Each of the four platform owners is among the top 10 soft-
ware companies worldwide (PwC, 2019) and maintains an ecosystem with thousands of complementors, divided into
HURNI ET AL. 7
different partner levels. To fathom the possibility of a longitudinal study, we then approached the local heads of each
platform owner's partner programs. Three of the four platform owners (referred to as Mars, Jupiter and Uranus) gave
their commitment and allowed us to select two partnerships from their ecosystem for in-depth study. To be consid-
ered for our study, a partnership had to be at least 5 years old, to ensure that the study timeframe would be suffi-
ciently long for power dynamics to emerge. We made sure that the partnerships had already ascended or were likely
to ascend from lower to higher partner levels, which increased the probability of observing variations in and changes
of power. Moreover, to ensure that the studied complementors would be in a structural power imbalance position,
all selected complementors were small-to-medium-sized, focused on providing a few specialised software comple-
ments, and lacking any intention to launch a competing platform.
5.1 | Data collection
We collected two types of qualitative data. First, we conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews at both the eco-
system and partnership levels. At the ecosystem level, we interviewed the three ecosystem managers responsible for
managing the entire network of complementors in Switzerland. At the partnership level, we interviewed the individ-
uals who are acknowledged as the critical representatives of platform owners and complementors in platform part-
nerships, that is, the partner managers from both sides (Foerderer, Kude, Schuetz, & Heinzl, 2019; Huber
et al., 2017; Hurni et al., 2020). To identify the developments over time, we interviewed every partner manager in
two separate rounds (ie, in 2013 and 2015), resulting in 24 additional interviews. The interviews lasted from
40 minutes to 2 hours, with an average duration of 75 minutes. Following the recommendations of Myers and New-
man (2007), all interviews were conducted in the interviewees' native language (ie, German) using a semi-structured
interview guide, took place on-site (except for two Skype interviews), and were recorded and transcribed. Second,
we gathered archival data, including ecosystem-wide documents (ie, the standardised partner contracts, partner pro-
gram guidelines and codes of conduct) and partnership-level documents (ie, company websites and newspaper arti-
cles). Table 1 shows our final sample of six partnerships with the interviews conducted at the partnership level.
5.2 | Data analysis
Our data collection and analysis approach were iterative, allowing us to respond to novel insights by continually
refining our data collection instruments. Throughout the analysis process, the collected data from multiple levels,
sides and points in time offered various triangulation opportunities (Charmaz, 2006). For the coding of our data, we
used NVivo 11 and followed an iterative bipartite approach, as suggested by Charmaz (2006). First, we coded each
piece of data line by line and in extensive detail using the four faces of power as starting points for process codes
(Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2013). This line-by-line analysis allowed us to curb the human tendency to make con-
ceptual leaps and orient the coding along extant theory, rather than having to develop entirely new categories from
the ground up (Charmaz, 2006). However, to ensure that our codes fully and incisively captured our context's speci-
ficities, we developed a set of highly contextualised second-order indicators (Miles et al., 2013). This coding
approach enabled us to reconstruct how the four faces of power manifested throughout the six analysed partner-
ships. Table 2 provides the definitions and indicators of the four faces of power in platform ecosystems.
To grasp whether and how different power dynamics are associated with different outcomes, we followed the
notion of partnership-level co-created value (Huber et al., 2017; Sarker et al., 2012; Schreieck et al., 2017). This
notion is recognised as a critical outcome variable in digital co-innovation (Kohli & Grover, 2008). The key idea is that
co-created value manifests in platform ecosystems in the form of discernible instances. Accordingly, we carefully
traced the instances of co-created value that manifested in each partnership over time. In this process, the distinc-
tion between thriving and withering partnerships emerged. In a thriving partnership, co-created value is growing, that
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is, different co-created value instances manifest frequently and continuously (eg, the parties jointly conquer new
markets and tap into new customer segments). In a withering partnership, co-created value is diminishing, that is,
instances of co-created value manifest less frequently and more sparsely (eg, the partnering companies create less
joint revenue and fail to maintain attraction among existing customers). Table 3 provides formal definitions and cod-
ing examples for these outcomes.
Next, we focused on exploring relationships between our core concepts to identify general patterns across the
six partnerships. For this purpose, we engaged in axial coding and systematically compared the dynamics within and
across cases using replication logic, memo writing and tables (Charmaz, 2006; Miles et al., 2013). This analysis step
led to identifying three different cycles and their underlying theoretical mechanisms (Charmaz, 2006). We
synthesised these cycles in a final step and integrated them into our final process model of reciprocal and multi-level
power dynamics in platform ecosystems.
6 | CASE NARRATIVES
The next two sections present rich narratives of how power processes unfolded in two of our six analysed partner-
ships. These two narratives serve to illustrate alternative power dynamics that we observed across our cases. The
TABLE 1 Studied cases and case-level interviews
Platform owners Complementors Description t Interviewees
Mars Deimosa Medium-sized company (Headcount: <250);
Partnership since 2001; Core products:
complementary management solutions
(customer relationship, case, and more) for
Mars's middleware platform
t1 • Mars A t1
• Deimos t1
t2 • PM Mars A t2
• Deimos t2
Phobosa Small company (Headcount: <50); Partnership
since 1998; Core product: complementary
enterprise document creation tool for Mars's
business productivity platform
t1 • Mars B t1
• Phobos t1
t2 • Mars B t2
• Phobos t2
Jupiter Callistoa Medium-sized company; Partnership since
1999; Core product: complementary energy-
trading and accounting tool for Jupiter's
database management platform
t1 • Jupiter A t1
• Callisto t1
t2 • Jupiter A t2
• Callisto t2
Themistoa Medium-sized company; Partnership since
1996—an erstwhile subsidiary of Jupiter;
Core product: heavily customised solution for
public companies and governments that
complements a variety of Jupiter's platforms
on multiple layers
t1 • Jupiter B t1
• Themisto t1
t2 • Jupiter B t2
• Themisto t2
Uranus Ariela Small company; Partnership since 2007; Core
product: complementary, hard- and software-
based point of sales solution for Uranus's
enterprise resource-planning platform
t1 • Uranus t1b
• Ariel t1
t2 • Uranus t2b
• Ariel t2
Umbriela Medium-sized company; Partnership since
2004; Core product: complementary field
service management solution for Uranus's
enterprise resource-planning platform
t1 • Uranus t1b
• Umbriel t1
t2 • Uranus t2b
• Umbriel t2
aThe complementor names match the moons' names of the planets Mars, Jupiter and Uranus (ie, the platform owners).
bAriel and Umbriel were managed by the same partner manager, with whom we conducted two interviews on the same day
(one for Ariel and one for Umbriel).
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first narrative stands for cases in which power dynamics unfolded in ways that led to the partnership's continued
thriving (ie, Deimos and Ariel). The second narrative stands for cases in which power dynamics unfolded in ways that
led the partnership to thrive initially but wither over time (ie, Deimos, Callisto, Themisto and Umbriel). Two figures
complement the narratives (see Figures 1 and 2). These Figures, as well as the four figures in the appendix (see
Figures A1-A4), visualise the observed power processes and their relationship with long-term movements in co-
created value (ie, toward thriving or withering). Building on the narratives, the case drawings and the systematic anal-
ysis of power dynamics across all cases, we developed our final model, which explains reciprocal and multi-level
power dynamics in platform ecosystems.
6.1 | Deimos—The complementor that excelled
Since 1998, Deimos has focused on enterprise document creation add-ons for the productivity platform of Mars:
“Mars always focuses on the masses when it comes to its products. Their productivity platform, for
example, is great for a single user, but not for corporate purposes. That is where we come into play”.
(Deimos t1)
TABLE 2 The four faces of power in platform ecosystems—definitions and indicators
Power face Definition Example indicators
Platform owner
domination
The imposition of a hegemonic ecosystem
framework that appears inevitable and
natural to the complementors (Fleming &
Spicer, 2014)
• The platform owner imposes
ecosystem-wide strategies, standards
and regulations that all complementors
must follow.
• The platform owner imposes platform
technologies to which all
complementors must adhere.
Platform owner coercion The platform owner directly persuades or
even presses a specific complementor to
do something “or else” (Fleming &
Spicer, 2014, p. 242)
• The platform owner persuades a
complementor to follow suit by
providing (dis-) incentives.
• The platform owner presses a
complementor to follow suit “or else”.
Platform owner
manipulation
The platform owner actively repurposes and
even misuses the hegemonic ecosystem
framework to ensure that actions occur
within desired boundaries (Fleming &
Spicer, 2014)
• The platform owner repurposes the
rules of the partner program to
provide a complementor preferred
access to resources.
• The platform owner (mis)uses existing
incentive schemes to enable a




The subjugation to different identity
templates and role expectations pertinent
in platform ecosystems (Fleming &
Spicer, 2014)
• The platform owner adheres to the
ecosystem mindset and redefines the
hegemonic ecosystem framework.




• The complementor conforms to the
responsibilities and duties associated
with different partner levels.
• The complementor fully commits to
platform-exclusivity.
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To complement Mars' platform, gain access to commercial and technical resources and become part of the eco-
system, Deimos had to sign the standard partner contract. This partner contract institutionalises the hegemonic
ecosystem framework in terms of strategies, technologies, standards, rules, and regulations (Mars: Domination): “In
the end, there is just the partner contract that all complementors must sign”. (Deimos t1).
Deimos signed the partner contract after careful evaluation of the upsides and downsides involved (Deimos:
Subjectification), which led to an initial increase in sales and considerable co-created value: “The partnership helped us
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In 2010, Deimos considered it necessary to deepen its relationship with Mars by ascending the partner levels to
satisfy its customers better. While such an ascent came with the promise of more rights and benefits, including
access to additional resources and better technical support, it also came with additional duties, such as investments
in certifications (Mars: Domination):
“We now need to pay the partner fee, and we must acquire certifications. Besides, we also need to
have a certain number of satisfied customers, and we must certify our products”. (Deimos t1)
Again, Deimos weighed the upsides against the downsides and decided to ascend to the highest partner level
(Deimos: Subjectification): “I have been with [Deimos] for 2.5 years, and it was my first activity to bring the partnership to
a higher level, more specifically, to the highest level”. (Deimos t1). After its ascent, Deimos continued to acquire new
customers while improving its software and services for existing customers.
Although the partnership was already thriving, Deimos had the ambition to stand out and began to distin-
guish itself beyond Mars' expectations of top-level complementors (Deimos: Over-Subjectification). For example,
although the partner program did not prohibit a diversification to other platforms, Deimos devoted itself exclu-
sively to Mars:
“We are a 100% partner of Mars. In the end, Mars is the market leader in that specific area, and we
do not want to scatter our resources on other platforms”. (Deimos t1)
Mars took note of this exceptional devotion and began recognising Deimos as one of its most critical com-
plementors in Switzerland:
“In the specific area of our productivity platform, they [Deimos] certainly are among the most impor-
tant partners. On the one hand, they indirectly promote our sales with their complement. On the
other hand, it is their enormous devotion to the partnership and Mars”. (Mars A t1)
Mars' recognition of Deimos' exceptional devotion and faithfulness became particularly important in situations
where the parties faced dyadic constraints. Specifically, when Deimos faced joint business opportunities that could
only be leveraged with some flexibility, this devotion enticed Mars to act in the partnership's interest (Mars:
Subjectification to the partnership mindset) and grant flexibility beyond the standard partner program (Mars: Manipula-
tion). For example, while the partner program stipulates standard information channels, Deimos received access to
additional information, including earlier and deeper insights into Mars' development division:
“We get in touch with the developers at the headquarters of Mars at a very early stage. Today, they
directly inform us about the developments of their productivity platform, which is why we even have
a more comprehensive understanding of this platform than the average Swiss employee of Mars”.
(Deimos t1)
Mars also enabled Deimos to present its add-ons on national and international stages and ensured that it
received various partner awards. These measures made Deimos better known to potential customers and was indeed
crucial in winning Deimos' largest international customer at the time:
“I believe it [the devotion and the partner level] is fundamental because it makes us more visible to
Mars on a European level. Not least because of that, we were able to acquire one of our largest cus-
tomers in the Netherlands, which became aware of our solution thanks to a Mars forum”.
(Deimos t1)
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The give and take between Deimos' exceptional devotion and faithfulness (Deimos: Over-Subjectification) and
Mars' flexible and benevolent response (Subjectification to the partnership mindset and Manipulation) meant that the
partnership continued to thrive, and more and more value was co-created:
“The closer we collaborate with Mars, and the more we devote ourselves to Mars, the more we are
trusted. It is the same for us; it strengthens our trust when we see the way Mars gives us a treat”.
(Deimos t1)
When Mars decided to streamline the ecosystem's internationalisation strategy, the give and take became
endangered. At that point, Mars realised that the unclear responsibilities between its national subsidiaries
plagued international projects. Hence, Mars decided to meet the ecosystem's needs and make international pro-
jects run more smoothly (Mars: Subjectification to the ecosystem mindset) by redefining the ecosystem framework
(Mars: Domination). Specifically, Mars used its right to unilaterally change ecosystem rules by introducing a fur-
ther differentiation among top-level complementors. These new partner levels imposed a more structured and
demanding process for managing international projects on the complementors. However, Mars also ensured that
the new partner levels came with valuable benefits, especially the reduction of obstructive competition between
its national subsidiaries:
“Well, [before] the Germans were not interested, as it was just a Swiss company and not one of their
partners. However, they have foreseen this issue, and as of July 1, they [Mars] have employees, I
would say, with a European focus”. (Deimos t2)
Since this obstructive competition had troubled Deimos for years, it gladly chose to comply with the
redefined ecosystem framework (Deimos: Subjectification), allowing the partnership to continue on its thriving
trajectory.
The partnership was again put to the test when the industry shifted toward cloud-based delivery models. During
this time, Mars again decided in the strategic interest of the ecosystem by deploying its platforms in the cloud (Mars:
Subjectification to the ecosystem mindset), redefining the ecosystem framework (Mars: Domination):
“At the moment, an obvious switch toward the cloud is happening. This concerns not only us, but also
the entire industry. Mars, our most important partner, makes us feel that quite plainly. Currently,
many things are happening on the way to the cloud, and that is where we are challenged”.
(Deimos t2)
This strategic reorientation directly played into the hands of Deimos, which conceived it as an opportunity to
make global product offerings:
“[…] the whole market will change. In the future, apps will replace the [local] applications known today
[…] One will inevitably become international – except for the ones that isolate themselves, but we do
not want that, right?” (Deimos t2)
Deimos voluntarily complied with the modified ecosystem framework by being one of the first complementors
to make its solutions cloud-ready (Deimos: Subjectification):
“[Deimos] is highly devoted and perfectly conforms to our cloud-focused strategy. There it [Deimos]
invests a lot, and in December, it is going to launch two critical apps that will complement our cloud-
based productivity platform”. (Mars A t2)
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However, Deimos encountered difficulties in migrating to the cloud, which could only be addressed with addi-
tional support from Mars, beyond the standardised partner program. In these situations, Mars continued to acknowl-
edge Deimos' exceptional devotion (Deimos: Over-Subjectification) and acted in the partnership's interest (Mars:
Subjectification to the partnership mindset) by granting Deimos additional support (Mars: Manipulation):
“There, we were heavily supported by Mars, as we already had the first apps running on the cloud-
based productivity platform. Mars took these apps and presented them during their developers' con-
ference as a paradigm for how they expect to work in the future”. (Deimos t2)
In yet another instance, Mars responded to Deimos' ongoing devotion (Deimos: Subjectification) by acting in the
partnership's interest (Mars: Subjectification to the partnership mindset) and admitting it on an exclusive advisory
board of partners (Mars: Manipulation). This act enabled Deimos to satisfy customer needs better:
“We are now part of an [international] advisory board of leading partners. That is what we like to do,
and this increased our impact. We always try to bring in our customers' opinions to present them to
Mars. As our CEO advises Mars in cloud applications for their cloud-based productivity platform, we
can currently do this very intensively. In other words, to highlight customer needs”. (Deimos t2)
6.2 | Phobos—The flagship complementor that sank to insignificance
Founded in 1998, Phobos focuses on management solutions (customer relationship, case, and more) for small- to
medium-sized enterprises and the public administration.
Although Phobos was already building its solutions on Mars' middleware platform from 1998 to 2001, it was not
until 2001 that it began thinking about joining the ecosystem. However, to become a partner at the lowest level,
Phobos had to comply with the hegemonic ecosystem framework (Mars: Domination). Specifically, this required the
signing of the partner contract that configured the duties and limitations, as well as access to exclusive resources.
Since access to these exclusive resources outweighed the partnership's downsides, Phobos decided to sign (Phobos:
Subjectification): “The rules are there and are accepted” (Phobos t1). This decision quickly paid off, as the formal part-
ner status served as a quality seal, resulting in a significant sales increase.
After some years, Phobos voluntarily ascended to the highest partner level (Phobos: Subjectification) to gain
access to increasingly valuable resources in return for accepting additional duties (Mars: Domination). For example,
the ascent to the highest partner level implied a dedicated partner manager's assignment, which allowed Phobos to
access more information that helped improve its solution significantly.
Interestingly, Phobos continued to devote itself even beyond Mars' expectations of top-level complementors
(Phobos: Over-Subjectification). For example, Phobos abandoned a competing platform in favour of offering its solu-
tion exclusively for Mars' platform:
“Because of our devotion, we became a sort of a Mars “joint”. In other words, we use its products as
best and as often as possible”. (Phobos t1)
Noting Phobos' exceptional devotion, Mars acted in the partnership's interest (Mars: Subjectification to the part-
nership mindset) and became more flexible to Phobos' needs (Mars: Manipulation). For example, Mars gave Phobos
preferred access to valuable resources, such as high-quality technical support and exclusive information:
“When I was visiting their headquarters, they even granted me a glimpse into their future productivity
platform and showed me their release plan, […]” (Phobos t1)
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For years, Phobos continued to devote itself beyond its duties, which Mars episodically reciprocated with extra
support. For example, Phobos proactively adopted a new front-end platform heavily promoted by Mars (Phobos:
Over-Subjectification). This devotion, in turn, enticed Mars to act in the partnership's interest (Mars: Subjectification to
the partnership mindset) and grant Phobos extra support (Mars: Manipulation):
“We supported each other […] [Mars] even helped us dispelling our customer's concerns when we
tried to introduce the new front-end platform”. (Phobos t2)
Initially, adopting the new front-end platform let the partnership thrive; Phobos attracted new customers and
contributed to the ecosystem's growth. However, in an unexpected strategic turn triggered by bleak market pros-
pects, Mars halted development of the platform and announced that it would discontinue support (Mars:
Subjectification to the ecosystem mindset): “One year later, there was the change, with the division head declaring the
death of the new front-end platform”. (Phobos t2). This turn redefined the hegemonic ecosystem framework and took
away a critical foundation of Phobos' relationship management solution (Mars: Domination), leaving Phobos with no
“alternative” (Phobos t2) than to depreciate all its investments into the new platform and recall the solution (Mars:
Coercion):
“At that time, we already had about twelve to fourteen instances of our solution running on the
front-end platform. We now have to call them back”. (Phobos t2)
The severe financial damage gravely damaged the partnership and made Phobos more cautious. Specifically,
Phobos began to question the redefined hegemonic ecosystem framework and reduce its excessive devotion
(Phobos: Subjectification):
“It was one of the most distinctive events, and it is because of this event that we no longer trust their
strategy”. (Phobos t2)
Driven by an emerging market shift in the software industry, Mars shifted its focus in 2013 from traditional on-
premises to cloud-based delivery models in the ecosystem's interest (Mars: Subjectification to the ecosystem mindset).
This strategic shift resulted in a partially redefined platform portfolio and ecosystem framework (Mars: Domination)—
see Deimos for details. However, for the new cloud platforms to gain a foothold in the market, Mars aimed to ensure
that a broad set of complements were already available on the date the platform was brought to market. To achieve
this, Mars persuaded select partners to go along with the strategic reorientation by co-funding their developments
(Mars: Coercion):
“Currently, we are developing apps for the new middleware platform, and Mars supports us by taking
over some of our development costs”. (Phobos t1)
Although Phobos' concerns persisted, Mars' financial support convinced it to go along with this strategic reor-
ientation (Phobos: Subjectification). Interestingly, Phobos was even able to attract some additional customers.
Over the years, and to remain competitive, Mars shifted its entire strategic focus to the cloud (Mars:
Subjectification to the ecosystem mindset). To this end, Mars has fundamentally redefined its platform portfolio and
ecosystem framework (Mars: Domination). This redefinition caused Phobos to question the partnership again (Phobos:
Subjectification). Although Phobos had been exceptionally fast in embracing “the cloud” (Mars A t2), its core customer
group—the public sector—turned out to be incredibly slow in adopting it: “The cloud tends to be adopted a bit slower
in the public sector than in other sectors” (Mars A t2). Mars' continued attempts to push Phobos toward the cloud
(Mars: Coercion) started to increase the conflict with Phobos' strategic focus on the public sector. Mars noted that
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Phobos was “not quite as dynamic” (Mars A t2) anymore, while Phobos felt that they were “no longer at the heart of
[Mars'] strategic investment focus” (Phobos t2). Although Phobos was still on the highest partner level and still
received all the standard benefits of that level, Mars no longer considered Phobos as a priority partner and conse-
quently stopped providing Phobos with preferential treatment:
“We are still a gold partner of Mars, but with the general cloud and app focus at Mars, we are no lon-
ger at the heart of [Mars's] strategic investment focus. […] it is obvious that their goals and ours no
longer match perfectly […] currently, we tend to feel that our partnership at the highest level is going
south”. (Phobos t2)
Mars' indifference caused Phobos great concern. Trapped in a situation where the needs of its customer base
conflicted with Mars's new strategy, Phobos began to re-evaluate the partnership and questioned whether the bene-
fits of the highest partner level still outweighed the associated duties:
“We asked ourselves what exactly the benefits of our partner level are. Just this week, we discussed
if it is still necessary […] no, it is not. In the end, other labels are much more valuable”. (Phobos t2)
Eventually, Phobos decided that it was time to make provisions for descending the partner level and offering its
solutions to other platforms (Phobos: Subjectification). This made the partnership with Mars wither; rather than offer-
ing platform-exclusive solutions tailored to its customer base's specific needs, Phobos started to act as a platform-
agnostic software services company that was open to many competing platforms.
7 | TOWARD A MODEL OF POWER DYNAMICS IN PLATFORM
ECOSYSTEMS
The six analysed platform owner–complementor partnerships differed in the value they co-created over time. Some
partnerships thrived throughout the entire relationship and continuously produced co-created value instances (see
Deimos & Mars and Ariel & Uranus in Table 4). Other partnerships thrived for some time, but then began to wither
(see Phobos & Mars, Callisto & Jupiter, Themisto & Jupiter and Umbriel & Uranus in Table 4), that is, after some time
of continuously producing instances of co-created value, these instances began to occur less regularly. These out-
come dynamics were systematically associated with different long-term power dynamics.
Next, we synthesise the power dynamics observed across our six cases in three power cycles before integrating
them into a model that explains how and why power in platform ecosystems evolves and how such dynamics trans-
late into outcome differences.
TABLE 4 Cross-case analysis
Partnership: Identified cycle sequence: Outcomes:
Deimos – Mars CC CC PC EC EC PC PC Thriving
Phobos – Mars CC CC PC PC EC~ EC EC~ Thriving then Withering
Callisto – Jupiter CC CC PC PC EC EC~ Thriving then Withering
Themisto – Jupiter CC CC EC PC EC EC EC~ Thriving then Withering
Ariel – Uranus CC CC PC EC PC EC Thriving
Umbriel – Uranus PC CC PC~ EC PC~ Thriving then Withering
Abbreviations: CC, Central power cycle; EC, Ecosystem redefinition cycle (if~: Complementor resists); PC, Partnership
accommodation cycle (if~: Platform owner resists).
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7.1 | The central power cycle
At the heart of our cases is a cyclical process in which complementors agree to subjectify themselves to the platform
owner's domination power in return for anticipated benefits. The basis for the platform owner's domination is the
hegemonic ecosystem framework that defines strategies, technologies, standards, rules and regulations. Com-
plementors must accept this hegemonic ecosystem framework to become a member of the ecosystem. The com-
plementors' decision to initially subjectify themselves to the ecosystem framework resulted from an evaluation
process in which they weighed the associated upsides against the downsides. The upsides entailed the eligibility to
complement a software platform and access valuable resources, including SDKs, market reports, sales support, or the
right to act as an official partner. The downsides entailed the duties and restrictions of being part of the ecosystem,
including the need to make platform-specific investments, adhere to APIs and design standards, or comply with
licensing policies and sales targets. Provided a complementor found that the upsides outweighed the downsides, it
subjectified itself, thereby enabling the platform owner to wield its domination power (see U > D in Figure 3).
As the partnerships progressed, this cyclical process, in which platform owner and complementor traded domi-
nation and subjectification occurred repeatedly. Specifically, whenever complementors considered ascending to
higher partner levels, they faced the characteristics of the corresponding tier of the ecosystem framework, which
promised access to increasingly valuable resources and implied increasingly demanding duties and restrictions.
Accordingly, the complementors evaluated these reconfigured upsides and downsides. As with the initial decision to
join the ecosystem, a complementor subjectified itself if the associated upsides outweighed the downsides (see
U > D in Figure 3). In every analysed partnership, the complementors voluntarily ascended to the highest partner
level, so this process unfolded as repeated cycles of complementor subjectification and platform owner domination.
As long as this central power cycle was sustained, the partnerships continued to thrive, that is, they experienced
systematic increases in co-created value. However, in all six partnerships, the hegemonic ecosystem frameworks
reached their adaptive limits in the face of internal and external events that put a strain on the central power cycle.
























F IGURE 3 Process model of power in platform ecosystems
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To sustain the central cycle in the face of such events, both parties had to alter their use of power. We capture these
responses in two additional power cycles (ie, the partnership accommodation cycle and the ecosystems redefinition
cycle), explained below.
7.2 | The partnership accommodation cycle
The partnership accommodation cycle is triggered by dyadic constraints that prevent platform partnerships from
responding appropriately to specific situational needs, including business opportunities or evolving customer needs.
Such dyadic constraints became increasingly salient across all our cases once complementors had ascended to the
highest partner level. They became salient because complementors at this level already had access to the most valu-
able resources. Thus, in the event of a dyadic constraint, the problem could not be resolved by further ascension.
Frequently, dyadic constraints tilted the platform owner toward the partnership mindset, creating a willingness to
wield power to benefit a particular partnership with a particular complementor (see platform owner subjectification
on the left in Figure 3). However, while dyadic constraints created awareness among platform owners that a
subjectification to the partnership mindset was warranted, they carefully evaluated whether the specific situation
and complementor deserved such a move. If the platform owners concluded that the subjectification to the partner-
ship mindset was justified, they resorted episodically to dyadic-level manipulation, that is, they adapted the upsides
and downsides by providing additional resources tailored to the needs of the specific partnership and complementor.
In doing so, the platform owners went well beyond what the ecosystem framework promised. The complementors
noted and appreciated such flexible use of manipulation in their favour. Specifically, whenever the platform owner
wielded manipulation, it lured complementors into continued subjectification by increasing the upsides of partnering
with the platform owner and relaxing some of the restrictions that had inhibited the partners from appropriately
responding to situational needs. Hence, the partnership accommodation cycle helps sustain the central power cycle
by adapting upsides and downsides, which contributes to continued thriving.
Complementors can actively entice the platform owner to tilt to a partnership mindset by voluntarily sub-
jectifying themselves above and beyond their partner level's role template. In doing so, the complementors could sig-
nal their continued devotion and faithfulness to the platform owner and the partnership (see top left in Figure 3).
Such over-subjectification seemed to act as an advance payment across the six cases, which platform owners recip-
rocated by subjectifying themselves to the partnership mindset and wielding manipulation power for the com-
plementors' benefit. The resulting closer and more intense cooperation enabled the partners to coordinate their
development and innovation efforts better and approach customers with more sophisticated offers, such that the
partnership continued to thrive. Conversely, if the platform owners concluded that a specific situation and com-
plementor was not worthy of adopting a partnership mindset and wielding manipulation power, the partnership
became less effective in leveraging joint business opportunities and began to wither.
7.3 | The ecosystem redefinition cycle
The ecosystem redefinition cycle is triggered by strategic discontinuities, that is, unforeseen changes that alter the
competitive landscape of the platform owner and its ecosystem. In our cases, new technologies were the primary
source of strategic discontinuities. For example, all three-platform owners responded to the rise of cloud computing
by phasing out their traditional on-premises software systems and transitioning toward cloud-based delivery models.
Because such strategic discontinuities invited fundamental and far-reaching adaptations, platform owners conducted
them with an eye on the ecosystem as a whole, rather than on individual partnerships. Accordingly, strategic discon-
tinuities tilted the platform owners' subjectification toward the ecosystem mindset (see platform owner
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subjectification in Figure 3). Specifically, the platform owners unilaterally redefined the ecosystem framework, thus
changing the basis of their domination.
The redefined ecosystem frameworks implied a redefined basis of the platform owner's domination, thus
reconfiguring complementors' rights and duties. In these cases, the complementors revisited their subjectification
and re-evaluated the reconfigured upsides and downsides. If complementors concluded that the reconfigured
upsides outweighed the downsides, they decided to subjectify themselves (U > D), thereby sustaining the central
power cycle and allowing the partnership to thrive. However, if the complementors concluded that the reconfigured
downsides outweighed the upsides (U < D), they developed a critical stance toward their subjectification and offered
resistance (see bottom right in Figure 3). In this case, the platform owners tried to coerce unruly complementors into
subjectification and imposed the reconfigured upsides and downsides. For example, platform owners stressed that
complementors that did not follow a new strategy would risk losing their partner status and associated resource
access. Interestingly, if the platform owner's coercive efforts broke the resistance of unruly complementors, this also
helped sustain the cyclical process, such that partnerships continued to thrive. In contrast, if platform owners failed
to coerce complementors into continued subjectification, the cyclical power process could not be sustained, and the
partnership began to wither.
7.4 | A model of power dynamics in platform ecosystems
We observed all three cycles at least once in every case. Table 4 summarises the sequence of the power cycles and
links these power dynamics to changes in outcomes. Figure 3 integrates the three cycles in our process model of power
in platform ecosystems. At the centre of our model is the central power cycle, in which complementors repeatedly eval-
uate whether to accept or reject the platform owner's domination power in return for certain benefits. Partnerships
that thrive sustain this central power cycle over time (see the first sequences of the power cycles in Table 4). To this
end, platform owners and complementors must dynamically adapt their wielding of power to the changing needs of
the partnership (partnership accommodation cycle) or the ecosystem (ecosystem redefinition cycle).
The partnership accommodation cycle, shown in the upper half of Figure 3, allows for overcoming dyadic con-
straints. This cycle entails that the platform owner tilts toward a partnership mindset and wields manipulation power
in favour of a specific partnership. From the complementor's perspective, such accommodation results in tangible
and beneficial adaptations of the upsides and downsides associated with the platform partnership to sustain the cen-
tral power cycle. Moreover, complementors can entice the platform owner to tilt toward the partnership mindset by
over-subjectifying themselves.
The ecosystem redefinition cycle, shown in the lower half of Figure 3, allows for a response to strategic disconti-
nuities. This cycle entails that the platform owner tilts to an ecosystem mindset and redefines the ecosystem frame-
work, and thus the basis of its domination power. As long as the complementors subjectify themselves to the
redefined domination power and the reconfigured upsides and downsides, the central power cycle is sustained. In
these cases, the partnerships can continue to thrive. However, if the complementors show resistance and reject the
redefined domination power, the central power cycle may no longer be sustained. In these cases, partnerships can
only continue to thrive if the platform owner successfully wields coercive power and imposes the reconfigured
upsides and downsides on the complementor. If a coercion attempt fails, the central power cycle breaks down, and
the partnership begins to wither.
8 | DISCUSSION
This study aimed to answer the following research questions: How does power manifest itself in platform partnerships,
how do the power moves of platform owners and complementors interact, and how do the resulting power dynamics relate
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to the value co-created in platform partnerships? To this end, we conducted an in-depth, multiple-case study of six
platform owner–complementor partnerships (Klein & Myers, 1999; Walsham, 1995). We used our cases to build a
process model that unpacks how and why power unfolds in platform ecosystems as three interlocking cycles, in
which both the platform owner and the complementor take an active role. Furthermore, our model shows how alter-
native power dynamics lead to platform partnerships that (continue to) thrive or (begin to) wither. Our findings con-
tribute novel insights into how the unique power paradox can be addressed through reciprocal power dynamics. In
addition, they highlight the active role that seemingly powerless complementors take within power processes and
stress the importance of the multi-level nature of power dynamics for co-creation processes and outcomes. Next,
we discuss the three key insights of our findings and their implications for platform ecosystem theory, power theory
and managerial practice.
8.1 | Theoretical Implications
8.1.1 | Addressing the power paradox through reciprocal power dynamics
Our study is the first to uncover how to address the unique power paradox in platform ecosystems. As such, it goes
beyond prior IS research on power, which is limited to contexts without a comparable power paradox. These con-
texts include traditional intra-organisational (Jasperson et al., 2002) or more transactional client–vendor relationships
(eg, Heiskanen et al., 2008; Levina & Orlikowski, 2009; Pozzebon & Pinsonneault, 2012), where the co-creation of
value between independent parties is not the prime objective. Moreover, prior studies on value co-creation focus on
relationships between equals, where power asymmetries are negligible (eg, Hart & Saunders, 1997; Valença
et al., 2018; Valença & Alves, 2017). Our study also considerably extends IS research on platform ecosystems, which
has previously approached power issues (Cusumano et al., 2019; Hinings et al., 2018) and the balancing of paradoxi-
cal tensions (Huber et al., 2017; Hurni et al., 2020; Sarker et al., 2012; Wareham et al., 2014), but that examined
these issues in isolation rather than interwoven.
Our study reveals that the power paradox in platform ecosystems can be addressed through a reciprocal and
dynamic process shaped by both the platform owner and the complementors. For its part, the platform owner mainly
wields domination power. This domination builds on an institutionalised, hegemonic ecosystem framework in which
the platform owner defines different partner levels with distinct upsides and downsides for the complementors. For
their part, the complementors have the right to self-select into different partner levels and, in return, to accept and
comply with the strategies, technologies, standards, rules, and regulations of that partner level, that is, subjectify
themselves. As long as the complementors do so and thus deem the platform owner's domination to be in their part-
nership's best interest, the power paradox remains latent, and the partnership continues to thrive.
However, the emergence of two events makes the power paradox salient, jeopardising the platform partner-
ship's continued thriving. First, in the event of dyadic constraints, the hegemonic framework is not sufficient to fully
respond to a partnership's specific situational needs, thus threatening to curtail the proactiveness and self-
determination of the complementors. To cushion tensions made salient by dyadic constraints, the platform owner
can episodically wield manipulation power in favour of the complementor, thereby luring it into continued
subjectification. Interestingly, complementors can increase the platform owner's proclivity to wield manipulation
power in their favour by engaging in over-subjectification. Second, in the event of strategic discontinuities, the plat-
form owner is forced to make unilateral decisions with an eye on the ecosystem as a whole rather than on individual
partnerships. Accordingly, the platform owner unilaterally redefines the hegemonic framework, leaving the com-
plementors with no other choice than to endorse the new strategic direction and accept the redefined framework or
else abandon the ecosystem by rejecting it. In these situations, the sporadic wielding of coercion to force com-
plementors into continued subjectification can stabilise a partnership and ensure its continued thriving.
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Hence, our insights suggest two basic processes for addressing the power paradox. First, the power paradox can
be kept latent by the platform owner defining and redefining a hegemonic ecosystem framework with multiple part-
ner levels, each with its specific upsides and downsides for the complementors. In doing so, the platform owner must
show sensitivity to the diverse and changing needs of the complementors to prevent undue suppression. For their
part, the self-determined complementors select a suitable partner-level—that is, decide independently to accept or
reject the platform owner's domination. Second, when the power paradox becomes salient, it can be managed by the
platform owner's episodic switch to manipulation power (in the event of dyadic constraints) or by redefining the heg-
emonic ecosystem framework and even the sporadic wielding of coercion (in the event of strategic discontinuities).
By unpacking how the unique power paradox in platform ecosystems can be addressed, our research also builds
a bridge between research focused on managing paradoxical tensions (but with no interest in power issues) and
research focused on power issues (but with no interest in paradox). More specifically, we can refine a widely held
assumption in ecosystem research. In particular, a fundamental tenet of this research is that the platform owner acts
“like a social planner [that] can coax, but […] cannot coerce third parties into innovation behavior that enhances the
welfare of the ecosystem” (Parker & van Alstyne, 2017, p. 3015). The key idea behind this assumption is that plat-
form owners influence the behaviour of complementors through incentives, guidelines, and general rules rather than
brute force (Rietveld et al., 2019; Rochet & Tirole, 2003). The platform owner's heavy reliance on domination power,
based on a general ecosystem framework with multiple power offers, appears to be in the spirit of such softer forms
of influencing behaviours. However, our study also points to the incompleteness of the widely held “coaxing only”
assumption. Specifically, our findings show that platform owners can wield more coercive power forms, above and
beyond coaxing, that force complementors into continued subjectification. Such occasional use of coercion proved
critical in sustaining the central power cycle in the event of strategic discontinuities. Thus, we show that combining
coaxing and coercion is not only possible but can be critical in enabling the (continued) thriving of partnerships.
8.1.2 | The active role of seemingly powerless actors
Our study unveils that the seemingly powerless complementors are not passive recipients but active and decisive
drivers of the power dynamics. Specifically, we unveil two novel ways through which complementors actively shape
power processes. First, the platform owner can only make use of its domination power if the complementor sub-
jectifies itself. Second, complementors can entice the platform owner to wield power in their favour by over-
subjectifying themselves.
These insights go beyond prior research on platform ecosystems. In platform ecosystem theory, a pivotal tenet states
that it is primarily the platform owner determining its ecosystem's fate (Gulati, Puranam, & Tushman, 2012). This tenet
has led to a dearth of research on the critical role that complementors play in achieving desirable outcomes (McIntyre &
Srinivasan, 2017). Platform governance, in particular, has thus far been seen as a standardisation problem that platform
owners solve unilaterally by designing (Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Boudreau, 2010, 2012; Gulati et al., 2012; Parker & Van
Alstyne, 2005) and practicing ecosystem-wide rules (Foerderer et al., 2019; Ghazawneh & Henfridsson, 2013; Huber
et al., 2017; Hurni et al., 2020; Wareham et al., 2014). We extend this research by showing that behind the curtain of
standardised platform governance, complementors take an active and vital role in ensuring that their specific partnership's
needs are not lost in the platform owner's governance standardisation efforts. First, complementors base their indepen-
dent decisions of whether to accept or reject the platform owner's domination power on a careful evaluation of upsides
and downsides for the partner dyad. Second, by engaging in over-subjectification, complementors can deliberately create
the precondition that makes the platform owner more willing to respond to partnership-specific needs. This active shap-
ing of power dynamics by complementors is essential for sustaining the co-creation process between them and the plat-
form owner—it enables the accommodation of specific and ever-changing local needs in a governance environment
driven by the platform owner's standardisation impetus. By showing that standardised platform governance does not
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solely determine an ecosystem's fate but also requires active shaping by complementors, our findings shed light on the
understudied role of complementors (McIntyre & Srinivasan, 2017).
Our findings on the active role of complementors also contribute to IS research on power. Prior IS research on
power has investigated power processes during the implementation and use of information systems in traditional
intra-organisational contexts (Jasperson et al., 2002), such as firms (Dhillon et al., 2011; Howcroft & Light, 2006;
Markus, 1983) or healthcare facilities (Cendon & Jarvenpaa, 2001; Doolin, 2004). In these contexts, power processes
are usually unidirectional, that is, the actor higher up in the hierarchy imposes its will upon the actor lower down. By
unpacking the active role of the seemingly powerless complementors, we show that whether the platform owner
can wield its domination power hinges on the complementors' acceptance/rejection of the ecosystem framework.
Moreover, by engaging in over-subjectification, complementors can entice the platform owner to wield manipulation
power in their favour. Thus, the complementors' power moves will co-determine future power moves of the platform
owner. Thus, in modern co-creation contexts such as platform ecosystems, power does not unfold as a unilateral
imposition by a single powerful actor but is also shaped bottom-up by seemingly powerless complementors.
8.1.3 | The multi-level nature of power processes
Our study identifies three interlocking power cycles that provide highly granular insights into how power
processes unfold across multiple levels. Overall, the three cycles show that how power is wielded at the ecosystem
level (through domination) is not independent of how it is wielded at the partnership level (ie, through manipulation
and coercion) and vice versa. While the central power cycle exclusively operates at the ecosystem level, the partner-
ship accommodation and the ecosystem redefinition cycles cause the platform owner to switch to the dyadic level
(ie, manipulation and coercion, respectively) based on each situation. Two pathways connect the central with the
peripheral cycles: First, the peripheral cycles can shape the central cycle from the bottom up, that is, the peripheral
cycles sustain the central cycle when faced with changing needs of a partnership or strategic discontinuities. Second,
the central cycle can shape the peripheral cycle from the top-down, that is, by engaging in over-subjectification,
complementors create a precondition for complementors to become willing to switch to the partnership accommo-
dation cycle.
These insights have two important implications for power research. First, our study is among the first to use
Fleming and Spicer's (2014) finer-grained conceptualization of power to explore how power processes unfold across
multiple levels. While Fleming and Spicer's (2014) conceptual work indicates that such interactions might exist, our
study is the first to provide fine-grained empirical insights into how different power faces interact across levels. Sec-
ond, our study suggests that domination and subjectification, the two systemic faces of power, exhibit episodic prop-
erties. Domination, for its part, has hitherto been understood as systemic in that it is inscribed and embedded in the
existing, unquestioned order of things that continually shape behaviours and appear natural and unchangeable
(Lukes, 1974). Our finding that the platform owner's domination builds on the hegemonic ecosystem framework res-
onates with its purported systemic nature. However, we also find that external events trigger the platform owner to
redefine this ecosystem framework. Hence, although domination is systemic, these infrequent redefinitions point
to additional episodic properties of domination power. The systemic nature of subjectification is commonly seen to
be rooted in its orientation, along with predefined, institutional role templates (Foucault, 1977, 1982). Our finding
that platform owners define various role templates for complementors and are themselves confronted with two dif-
ferent sets of role expectations echoes the purported systemic nature of subjectification. However, we also find that
complementors adopt the different identity templates defined in the partner program and that platform owners
switch between the ecosystem and the partnership mindsets situationally. Notwithstanding the systemic nature of
institutionalised role expectations, the dynamic alternation between them points to important episodic properties
of subjectification. Our findings indicate that domination and subjectification may be better understood as dual
forms of power that are simultaneously systemic and episodic.
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8.2 | Managerial implications
Our findings translate into managerial advice for platform owners acting from extreme power positions, while provid-
ing considerable freedom to complementors. Specifically, our findings unveil two strategies of wielding power with a
restraint that effectively addresses this paradox. The first strategy entails defining and adapting ecosystem frame-
works with an eye on complementor needs. The second strategy entails the dynamic transition to manipulation
power to respond to dyadic constraints and lure complementors into continued subjectification. Moreover, we
advise platform owners to resort to coercion only in exceptional situations. Specifically, when complementors hesi-
tate to follow suit with a strategic reorientation, coercion can help sustain the central power cycle and thus the con-
tinued thriving of the partnership.
Our findings are also of considerable relevance for managers of complementor companies. Specifically, we
advise these managers to accept that platform owners possess considerable power and that they will inevitably wield
this power. Therefore, rather than resist this power, complementors should embrace their subjectification to that
power as an opportunity to actively shape how the platform owner enacts its power. Complementors should actively
sense whether the partnership's continued thriving will require additional support from the platform owner. If this is
the case, they should prepare for such situations by strategically engaging in over-subjectification and making this
over-subjectification visible to the platform owner. This behaviour will make the platform owner more willing to use
its manipulation power to benefit the complementor when and if it requires additional support.
8.3 | Limitations and future research
Our research is not without limitations. First, all three platform owners in our sample are major enterprise software
companies with considerable market power. In contrast, all complementors in our sample are small- to medium-sized
niche players. This theoretical sampling ensured that we only investigated partnerships characterised by extreme
resource and power asymmetries. However, a platform owner does not start in a dominant role and may not stay in
that role forever. Likewise, complementors may grow over time and even decide to become platform owners them-
selves. Whether and how such changes in the partnering companies' market position will affect power dynamics was
beyond this study's scope. Therefore, future research should investigate partnerships in which the platform owner
and/or the complementor experience considerable changes in their market position to understand power dynamics
when the resource asymmetries begin to vanish. Second, there is some risk that precisely these resource and power
asymmetries may have influenced the responses of the complementors. Although we have taken multiple precau-
tions against such bias, some subtleties of power dynamics may have remained hidden but not absent of effect.
Therefore, future research should further refine our findings by building on data sources that are less likely to be
biased or influenced by power asymmetries or systematically integrate the perspective of complementors that
decided to abandon the ecosystem. Third, while our study focused on providing rich and deep insights into power
dynamics in ecosystems, another valuable avenue for future research would be to investigate how different faces of
power combine to drive outcomes, such as joint partnership success. Such a study could build on the conceptual
foundations developed in this study while collecting data from many cases, which could then be analysed using quali-
tative comparative analysis.
9 | CONCLUSION
Platform ecosystems have become the dominant arrangement through which innovative software products and ser-
vices are co-created, marketed and distributed. Therefore, it is essential to understand how platform owners and
complementors can effectively respond to the unique power paradox in their partnerships—which is rooted in the
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necessity for complementors to be highly self-determined and proactive in the face of an extremely powerful plat-
form owner. To understand how this power paradox can be addressed, we investigate the power dynamics that
unfolded in six platform partnerships. Our findings reveal that power in platform ecosystems unfolds in cycles (ie,
through a central power cycle, a partnership accommodation cycle and an ecosystem redefinition cycle), that these
cycles are intertwined, and that dyadic constraints and strategic discontinuities drive the dynamic transitions
between these cycles. Moreover, our findings reveal how the resulting power dynamics influence the continued
thriving of platform partnerships. Together, our findings suggest that the power paradox in platform ecosystems can
be addressed through a reciprocal process in which both the platform owner and the complementors take an active
role and dynamically respond to the changing needs of the ecosystem and the partnership. By drawing attention to
the active role of seemingly powerless complementors, our results shed light on an essential but understudied driver
of value co-creation, allowing us to refine multiple fundamental tenets of ecosystem theory. In addition, our findings
uncover how different faces of power interact with each other, offering unique insights into how power dynamics
play out across multiple interconnected levels. These insights allow us to challenge the notion of strictly separate
systemic and episodic forms of power. We hope that the findings of this study will stimulate further research on this
topic.
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APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTARY CASE DRAWINGS
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